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THE CONSTRICTED MEANING OF
"COMMUNITY" IN COMMUNITY POLICING
MARY I. COOMBS*
In a conference in which the dominant approach has
been approving of the Terry doctrine and contemporary po-
lice practices, I want to play a somewhat contrarian role.
Substantive criminal laws forbidding relatively harmless
behaviors can serve the police as a substitute for the
authority to carry out Terry stops, as Tracey Meares1 and
Debra Livingston point out. While I refer to Terry and
substantive law as alternatives, what we have now is a
situation in which the police have both Terry and an ever-
expanding substantive authority from quality of life laws.
When I use the term "quality of life" laws I refer to laws
dealing with behavior that cannot be classified as serious
crime.' They have two functions. First, the behavior for-
bidden is itself arguably a disruption of the civility of public
* Visiting Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, Spring 1998;
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1 See Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the Relevance of Politics, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1343 (1998).
2 See Debra Livingston, Police Patrol, Judicial Integrity and the Limits of Judi-
cial Control, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1353 (1998). Professor Livingston develops this
analysis in more depth in her article, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551
(1997) [hereinafter Quality of Life]. Laws that forbid relatively harmless behaviors
include those which regulate unreasonable noise, "automobile cruising," panhan-
dling, and camping. Id. at 627. Although these public order laws include specific cri-
teria which govern enforcement, the police still retain a high level of discretion. See
id. at 593. This discretion is exercised during the investigation of the facts, applica-
tion of the law, and when the police decide to make an arrest, give a citation, or
simply ignore the violation. See id. Any attempt by the courts to regulate police dis-
cretion by invalidating these laws, may actually be detrimental to communities. See
id. at 594. It can increase the already dominant role of private police and actually
promote misconduct by the public police because they will continue to make arrests
in violation of other laws. See id. at 627-34.
3 See Steve Marshall, et. al., New York Tackling Quality of Life Crimes, USA
TODAY, July 7, 1994, at 3A (quoting Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of New York City, as
stating that quality of life crimes, such as panhandling, public drinking, and graffiti,
are legally considered "misdemeanors and petty offenses").
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life.' Secondly, the enforcement of such laws-and the gen-
eral knowledge that such laws are enforced-can indirectly
affect serious crime.' For example, gangs may no longer
congregate in public places and people may refrain from
carrying guns on the streets if they are at significant risk of
being arrested under one of a plethora of quality of life
laws. Such laws might include those forbidding panhan-
dling,6 or drinking in public,7 or-my personal favorite as a
temporary Manhattanite-jaywalking. s I don't think any-
body is going to say jaywalking is a serious crime. If the
city decides seriously to enforce rules against jaywalking,
it's for different reasons. (At a minimum, I find it hard to
believe that anyone except Mayor Giuliani would think
jaywalking is a crime against which we want to devote any
significant police resources.)
For example, it has been viewed that beggary represent the destruction of so-
cial order and the collapse of the American work ethic. See Robert C. Ellickson, Con-
trolling Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space
Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1182 (1996); see also Young v. New York City Transit
Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that an ordinance prohibiting pan-
handling and begging on the subways was-designed to eliminate the feeling of har-
assment and fear felt among passengers of the subway system when they were pan-
handled); William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil
Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 1 J.L. & POL'Y 447, 449-50 (1994) (suggesting
that the disruption of public life is due to the chaos created by low-level offenders,
such as aggressive panhandlers, illegal vendors, and homeless persons).
5 See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deter-
rence, 95 MICH. L REv. 2477, 2488 (1997) (suggesting that social influence can deter
major crimes because orderliness within a community demonstrates to outsiders
that crime will not be tolerated); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning,
and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 368-73 (1997) (suggesting that the 40% drop in
murders, 30% drop in robberies, and 25% drop in burglaries in New York City since
1993 are due to strict police enforcement of minor violations).
6 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3311 to 3316 (1981 & Supp. 1998); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 97.1 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-126 (1997);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21 § 1050.6 (1995) (prohibiting begging and pan-
handling on the transit system).
7 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-7-212(c)-(e) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §
123.46(2) (West 1997); see also City of Lake Charles v. Henning, 414 So.2d 331 (La.
1982) (holding that a city ordinance that prohibited drinking alcoholic beverages
from an open container in public contributed to public welfare); People v. Elhage,
537 N.Y.S.2d 375 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that a city ordinance which prohibited
possession with the intention of consuming alcohol in a public place benefited the
public).
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5a-212(c) (1989) (requiring pedestrians to use only
the crosswalk when there are adjacent intersections controlled by traffic signals);
see also MINN. STAT. § 169.21(3) (1986 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-34
(West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-79 (1997).
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Although the term "quality of life crimes" is relatively
recent in popular discourse, we have had laws dealing with
such crimes for a very long time. In effect, these were the
crimes forbidden in the law held unconstitutional in Pa-
pachristou' As the facts in that case make apparent, such
rules spread an exceedingly wide net which can be-and in
that case rather clearly was-applied in a highly discrimi-
natory fashion. One of the arrests challenged in Papachris-
tou involved the stop of a car in which two black men and
two white women were riding." The more recent quality of
life statutes define the forbidden behavior more precisely
than did the Cleveland or the Jacksonville loitering ordi-
nances and thus avoid the vagueness that was the basis of
the Supreme Court's holding of unconstitutionality. None-
theless, both because of the lack of precision at the margins
and, more importantly, because of the breadth of their cov-
erage, they still provide the opportunity for almost unfet-
tered discrimination in enforcement.
Consider, for example, laws against wearing gang col-
ors, loitering near an automated teller machine" or jay-
walking.12 I have jaywalked, hung around the entrance to
an ATM, and worn the colors associated with Crips or
Bloods. 3 You will not be surprised to hear that I have
never been stopped by a police officer for doing so, even
when I have engaged in the behavior directly in front of an
officer. I have not been arrested, I believe, because as an
apparently middle class, clearly middle-aged, white female,
I'm not the sort of person they want to stop for those behav-
9 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
'0 See id. at 158-59. Justice Douglas' disbelief of the police officer's claim "that
the racial mixture in the car played any part in the decision to make the arrest" is
apparent. Id. at 159.
" See Livingston, Quality of Life, supra note 7, at 622 n.388 (discussing a San
Francisco law which made it illegal to loiter for more than one minute within 30 feet
of an ATM); see also Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1224-25 (discussing ordinances pro-
hibiting begging in proximity to an ATM).
12 See Livingston, Quality of Life, supra note 7, at 622 n.338; see also NEWYORK,
N.Y., RULES, tit. 34 § 4-04 (1992).
'3 The Crips and the Bloods are among the most notorious, widely proliferated
street gangs. See MALCOLM W. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG 102 (1995)
(discussing the presence of the Bloods and the Crips in fifty-three cities). Members
of the Crips and the Bloods wear colored bandannas to indicate their membership in
their respective gangs. See IRVING A. SPERGEL, THE YOUTH GANG PROBLEM 98
(1995) (discussing the manner of dress of numerous street gangs).
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iors. 14 Similarly, the web of traffic laws can allow a police
officer to stop virtually any motorist within a minute and a
half of first observing him for an obscured license plate, a
cracked tail light, or a failure to signal a turn.5 I walk
through Manhattan, and I see at least 100 traffic offenses
every two blocks. Often there are police standing on the
corner, presumably seeing what I see, yet I have not yet
seen a single traffic arrest. Non-enforcement of low-level
criminal laws, though it encourages a certain disrespect for
the law, is less troubling than discriminatory enforcement.
The latter is facilitated by the existence of laws that make
us all potential criminals and the lack of any effective legal
limitation on the officer's decisions of whom and when to
arrest. As Whren" made clear, the only constitutional limit
on an officer's arrest decision is whether the officer has seen
some law broken. It is constitutionally irrelevant why he or
she has chosen to enforce this law against this person at
this time. Pretext evaporates in the presence of probable
cause or, presumably, reasonable suspicion.
The tenets of community policing 7 are that maintaining
order and preventing low level disruptions of public space
are important, both for creating a viable community and for
their indirect effect on the rate of serious crime."8 Commu-
14 Livingston notes that the overbreadth of rule-like formulations which make
my behavior "criminal" does not, in fact, solve the problem of discretionary enforce-
ment practices. See Livingston, Quality of Life, supra note 7, at 616-18.
'r In one Texas community, 37% of all arrests were made by police "traffic en-
forcement personnel," and only about half of those arrests were for traffic offenses.
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 299; see also David A. Harris, Car Wars: The
Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 559-60
(1998) (discussing discretion ceded to police under existing Supreme Court prece-
dent).
'6 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
17 "Community policing" is a theory of law enforcement that emphasizes coop-
eration between the police and the citizens of the community, as well as greater po-
lice involvement in neighborhood affairs, and enforcement of quality-of-life laws. See
Livingston, Quality of Life, supra note 7, at 575-76 (comparing the policies of com-
munity policing to those common to other theories of law enforcement); WESLEY G.
SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING CHICAGO STYLE 5 (1997)
(defining community policing)
'8 Studies conducted in Chicago communities in which Chicago's community po-
licing approach, CAPS (Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy), was newly imple-
mented showed a strong correlation between policing against low-level disorder and
a reduction in serious crime. See id. at 228-35. Residents of the CAPS neighborhoods
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nity policing thus involves providing the police tools such as
quality of life laws and encouraging them to use those tools.
Yet these are laws that no rational person would want en-
forced 100% of the time according to their terms. Thus, an
inevitable cost of a community policing approach is that it
encourages and legitimizes police discretion.9 Inevitably,
that discretion is subject to misuse-a misuse that is likely
to be directed at members of particular classes and particu-
lar races. While some elements of the local community will
applaud such policing, which clears the streets of
"undesirables," and makes them safer for the law-abiding,"°
other elements of the community will perceive that discre-
tion as racist.2' Data indicates that the necessarily discre-
tionary enforcement of traffic laws, for example, is racist at
least in effect, if not in intent.' All of which brings us to
consistently reported a decrease in more serious criminal activities after the pro-
gram was established. See id.
'9 One commentator has gone so far as to claim that quality of life laws extend
to police officers "dictatorial power over the streets." Vivian Burger, The Bill of
Rights, Community Policy, and Community Democracy, 1 MICH L. & POLY REV. 387,
388 (1996) Burger notes:
However sensible or proper the actions of a specific officer may appear ini-
tially in an isolated instance, maintaining order through loitering and
similar types of statutes implicates systematic issues .... Unchecked
power played out primarily in a manner invisible to outside monitors has
always presented a significant specter of arbitrariness, selective enforce-
ment, and discrimination.").
Id.
20 See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 51-57 (1990) (claiming
broad consensus in favor of such forms of quality of life law enforcement).
21 See Livingston, Quality of Life, supra note 7, at 589 and sources cited therein.
22 See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333,
344-54 (1998). While in theory a constitutional violation has occurred if there is a
pattern of intentional racial targeting, it is almost impossible to prove this unless
the police officer is more honest than most police officers are likely to be, since the
Supreme Court has refused to find violations of the equal protection clause on the
basis of even statistically indisputable patterns of racialized decision making. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (finding no violation despite huge dispari-
ties in the infliction of capital punishment based on the race of offender and of vic-
tim). Consider also to the debate over the 100-to-1 differential under the Federal
sentencing guidelines between crack cocaine, primarily sold by African-Americans,
and cocaine powder, a drug more commonly used and sold by whites. Appellate
courts have refused to find this disparity a basis for departing from those guide-
lines, and the Congress has similarly declined to change the guidelines to reflect a
less racialized pattern. See generally United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510
515-17 (6th Cir. 1997); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 364-86
(1997).
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the nub of the problem. Is there any way, as Professor
Stuntz noted, to give the police adequate means to do their
job while minimizing the racial impact of their behavior?
Tracey Meares and Debra Livingston both suggest that
a community control approach to the relationship among
policing, community concerns and law provides a more ef-
fective approach than the old fashioned rule of
law/individual rights approach associated with the Warren
Court and with decisions like Papachristou. One positive
aspect of such an approach is that it acknowledges, as the
Warren Court's approach rarely did, the interest of minority
communities in effective policing.23 As Randy Kennedy has
pointed out,24 members of minority communities are dispro-
portionately the victims of crime as well as the victims of
misdirected police discretion. 5
I want to raise here, however, one small criticism of the
community policing model, especially insofar as it is seen as
an adequate political response to the problems of racialized
law enforcement. The communities that suffer from under-
enforcement and over-enforcement aren't exactly the same
community, even when they can each be described as
"minority communities." A community policing model tends
to empower those who want more policing at the expense of
those who want more control of the police. The former
group is likely to be more politically organized. Their
members and representatives are more likely to go to fo-
rums organized by the police to discover the mood and
needs of the "community." Meanwhile, those who are most
disproportionately the objects of police enforcement of
quality of life laws are young black men. 6 Both because of
their ages and because many of them have criminal records,
many will be ineligible to vote. Even if they can legally
See generally Livingston, Quality of Life, supra note 7, at 571-73 (noting that
the community relations experimentation, which set the stage for the development
of the community policing theory, revealed that part of the hostility inner city resi-
dents felt towards police resulted from the perception that the police permitted
crimes in poor neighborhoods that they would not permit in other neighborhoods).
24 See KENNEDY, supra note 28 at 69-75.
See generally id. at 138-67.
26 See generally Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of
Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2249-57
(1998).
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vote, they are a group whose political alienation makes
them unlikely to participate in any effective way in the po-
litical process. The disjuncture between the cultural styles
affected by this group and those of the police make attempts
to communicate across that divide difficult.
Furthermore, the "community" whose interests are to
be considered in a community policing model is often ill-
defined or defined in a way disproportionately likely to ex-
clude those whose interests are in less aggressive policing.
What are the boundaries of the community? Is it, for ex-
ample, the entire city of New York or a local community
defined by the boundaries of a particular police precinct?
The proponents seem to be suggesting a more localized
model, with the paradigm of responsiveness to a particular,
often minority, community in Harlem or Washington
Heights. But not all local communities are minority. If the
police are responsive to the residents in a white, middle
class neighborhood, they will be encouraged to enforce laws
against outsiders who don't belong and who, under that
model, have no voice in defining the mission of the police in
that precinct. If the precinct boundaries largely overlap
downtown business districts, then the community is pre-
sumably the people who run the businesses and who want
to make the streets safe for affluent shoppers.
In that regard, let me suggest as a paradigm for the
dangers of police responsiveness to "community" concerns
the situation underlying the case of Pottinger v. City of Mi-
ami.27 That case involved a challenge to the police response
to homeless people in Miami. Discovery in the case showed
that police "sweeps" to remove homeless people from the
streets were often a response to complaints by merchants
that the plethora of homeless people was deterring other
people from coming there and supporting the businesses by
shopping." The police responded by arresting homeless
people and hauling them away for quality of life infractions:
sleeping in public, drinking in public, loitering, urinating in
public, etc.29 My personal favorite was the arrests for litter-
ing. Again, I will admit to being an unarrested criminal; I
27 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
28 See id. at 1581.
29 See id. at 1559-60.
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have dropped a gum wrapper on the sidewalk instead of the
litter basket on occasion. Homeless people, however, were
arrested for littering." In some cases, the police were quite
creative: W hen a homeless person would lay a piece of
cardboard down so he was not sleeping right on the cold
concrete of the sidewalk, the police would deem that an in-
stance of littering worthy of a custodial arrest. Creative,
hard-fought lawyering by-yes-the ACLU, along with
some documented outrageous police behavior led ultimately
to a settlement in Pottinger.3' Terry itself, cognizant of the
racial context of low-level police enforcement, can be seen
as an attempt to provide some legal means of controlling
the police. Subsequent cases, however, make clear that the
Constitution will not provide an effective means to respond
to misdirected police discretion.32  Community policing
similarly is unlikely to provide an effective means of con-
trol. We should not forget, however, the range of subconsti-
tutional "rule of law" tools. State constitutions can be con-
strued to provide greater protections than the Federal
Constitution; states can by statute choose to control their
own police forces and police departments can by rule choose
to control the discretion of patrol officers. One particular
limitation, which might come from any of those sources,
seems particularly sensible. Even if certain quality of life
offenses are defined as criminal, they need not be made a
legitimate basis for a full custodial arrest or for a perma-
nent criminal record.3 It is unclear, even from a purely law
enforcement perspective, if it is sensible to permit or en-
3' See id.
3' The opinion notes that the police often impermissibly confiscated the posses-
sions of homeless people arrested for such quality of life offenses and rousted them
from public parks shortly before the parks were to open (in effect, for the non-
homeless population). See id. at 1556-59. The documentation collected for the litiga-
tion included a heartbreaking photograph of possessions collected and burned by the
police from a gathering place of homeless men, including a partially burned Bible
(personal recollection of author).
See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998); Ohio v. Robi-
nette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). See gener-
ally David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556 (1998).
People v. Howell, 403 N.E.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. 1980) (mem.) suggests that the
use of full custodial arrests for traffic infractions is problematic under New York
law. My hope is that this notion be clarified and expanded both to non-traffic minor
crimes and to other jurisdictions.
[Vol. 72:13511374
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courage police to spend the resources for a custodial arrest
for jaywalking, littering or turning without signaling.
When we add in the social cost of race and class patterned
enforcement, the case for legally enforceable limitations on
the authority to execute such arrests becomes still stronger.
Of course, as an academic, I have the advantage of
spinning out ideas without having to test them in the real
world or even, in a context like this, turning them into con-
crete proposals. Our next speaker, Judge Keenan, has been
in that real world and we can now hear his thoughts about
criminal procedure and substantive criminal law.
* ************
